Turkish drones are no longer a peripheral element of the Sudanese army’s arsenal. Strikes that Chad said hit a military convoy inside its territory in August 2026, later condemned by the United States, brought the Sudanese Armed Forces’ air campaign beyond the country’s borders and renewed scrutiny of Turkey’s expanding role in the conflict. What began with arms transactions and technical assistance has increasingly developed into openly acknowledged defence cooperation between Ankara and Khartoum.
A Le Monde report added a further dimension, describing Turkey as the army’s principal military backer since the war began. It said Ankara had supplied TB2 and Akinci drones and placed trainers alongside Sudanese forces, while Saudi Arabia was financing purchases of Turkish drones and Pakistani weapons for the army.
According to Le Monde, signs of Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani coordination in Sudan predated the formal agreement by more than a year. The newspaper also reported a Pakistani contract said to be worth $1.5 billion, covering fighter aircraft, armoured vehicles and drones for the Sudanese armed forces.
Washington’s response to the Chad incident formed part of a wider effort to curb arms flows into Sudan. At the UN Security Council, the United States proposed extending the arms embargo imposed on Darfur in 2005 to the whole country, including drones. It warned that external military and financial backing was prolonging the conflict and increasing the risk of its spreading across the region.
Since late 2024, Bayraktar TB2 and Bayraktar Akinci systems have reportedly become part of the army’s air capability. Africa Defense Forum said Turkey continued to support the military leadership through sales of both platforms, while Fair Observer reported the use of Turkish Eren loitering munitions launched from Akinci aircraft. It linked those operations to the breaking of sieges around Dilling and Kadugli and to reopened supply routes south of El Obeid.
Spanish defence monitoring outlets have also reported encounters between heavy drones in Sudanese airspace, involving Turkish and Chinese systems. Sudanese forces are also understood to operate Iranian technology, turning the country’s skies into an increasingly competitive arena for several foreign military systems.
The events in Chad underscored the sensitivity of that development. On 22 August 2026, Chad’s military general staff said aircraft and drones believed to belong to the Sudanese army, or allied forces, had struck a convoy of about 200 vehicles in eastern Ennedi on 20 and 21 August. The location was more than 100 kilometres inside Chadian territory. The Sudanese army said the convoy was carrying reinforcements for the Rapid Support Forces.
There is no material evidence establishing that a Bayraktar drone carried out the strikes, and that distinction remains important. But Washington’s condemnation of the operation on Chadian soil pointed to a broader concern: the drone war is now producing consequences beyond Sudan’s frontiers.
Turkey’s involvement predates the Chad incident. In March 2025, the Washington Post reported, citing contracts, correspondence, records and visual material, that Baykar had entered into dealings worth at least $120 million with the Sudanese side. The arrangements covered drones, related equipment and the presence of company personnel providing technical support.
In May 2026, Chatham House examined reports that Turkey had supplied the army with drone systems, although Ankara denied directly providing them to the armed forces. The relationship gained clearer political backing after a June 2026 meeting between Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, when the Turkish presidency said defence was among the areas of cooperation between the two countries.
Ankara’s interests extend beyond the immediate conflict. Sudan offers Turkey strategic access to the Red Sea as well as potential opportunities in mining, infrastructure, agriculture and future reconstruction. Suakin has therefore remained part of Turkey’s strategic outlook, although there is still no evidence that a proposed military base project has been revived.
The available evidence does not show that Turkey is a direct combatant in Sudan’s war. It does, however, show that Ankara has moved beyond the role of a commercial and diplomatic partner. The Chad strikes do not prove that Turkish drones were used, but they illustrate how capabilities Turkey helped build are now embedded in a conflict whose effects are no longer contained within Sudan.
